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ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: CENTRA HEALTH, INC. V. MULLINS
L. Steven Emmert *
I. INTRODUCTION
For generations, Virginia plaintiffs attorneys pleading wrong-
ful death cases have faced an unpleasant truth: Virginia law
permits a recovery for either a wrongful death claim or a survival
claim, but not both.1 The rules of court permit pleading in the al-
ternative, even if the claims are inconsistent with each other, 2 but
it is clear that a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery. In order
to prevent redundant recoveries, trial courts require plaintiffs to
elect between these two alternative claims.
The requirement of an election is by no means unique to per-
sonal injury cases. For example, a plaintiff suing for breach of a
contract for the sale of land must elect between specific perfor-
mance and a claim for damages. A widow is entitled to sue to
claim rights under her late husband's will, or she can elect to re-
nounce the will and claim a statutory share of his augmented es-
tate.4 In these and similar situations, the plaintiff is not entitled
to both ends of the bargain; she cannot, for example, compel the
sale and receive damages because it did not occur. Otherwise, the
plaintiff could find herself "in a better position than [she] would
* Partner, Sykes, Bourdon, Ahern & Levy, Virginia Beach, Virginia. J.D., 1982, Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law; B.A., 1979, Richmond College. The author is the princip-
al publisher of Virginia Appellate News & Analysis, established in 2005 and available at
http://www.virginia-appeals.com/.
1. See Lucas v. HCMF Corp., 238 Va. 446,449, 384 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1989).
2. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:4(k) (Repl. Vol. 2009) ("A party may also state as many separate
claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency . . . ."); see also VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-281 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (permitting the pleading of "alternative facts and theories of re-
covery.").
3. See Jennings v. Realty Developers, Inc., 210 Va. 476, 482, 171 S.E.2d 829, 834
(1970).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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have enjoyed had the contract been performed as expected," a re-
sult the law will not countenance even for a wronged plaintiff.5
In the realm of torts, the election doctrine allows a single re-
covery under two mutually exclusive rights of action. But some-
times these alternate theories call for different evidence of dam-
ages. In a wrongful death suit, the claim is made on behalf of the
beneficiaries of the estate, to compensate them for the loss of the
decedent.6 Evidence of damages generally focuses on solace, fu-
neral expenses, and loss of financial support.7 In a survival ac-
tion, the claim is that of the decedent, brought to recover for his
injuries before he died; evidence of damages usually comprises
expert testimony on things such as the likely pain the decedent
suffered before he died.8
The statutory framework provides that these rights of action
are alternates, not complements. The survival statute entitles a
decedent's survivors to continue to press his suit if he dies while
the case is pending.9 The Wrongful Death Act provides a remedy
for the death.10 If the decedent dies from causes unrelated to the
wrongful act, then the survival claim is the only one that can be
maintained. If he dies as a result of the wrongful act, then the ac-
tion must be amended to state a claim for wrongful death." Thus,
as long as the plaintiff knows whether the injury caused the
death or not, the decision is easy.
5. Nichols Constr. Corp. v. Va. Machine Tool Co., 276 Va. 81, 90, 661 S.E.2d 467, 472
(2008).
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
7. Id. § 8.01-52 (Repl. Vol. 2007). Section 8.01-52 specifies five categories of damages
that may be recovered in wrongful death cases. The list is not exclusive, but the decedent's
pre-death pain and suffering has never been regarded as a compensable item in such a
claim. See Breeding v. Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 659-60, 159 S.E.2d 836, 842 (1968).
8. The former survival statute provided that "[n]o cause of action for injuries to per-
son or property shall be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of
action existed, provided, however, in such action no recovery can be had for mental an-
guish, pain or suffering." VA. CODE ANN. § 8-628.1 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (superseded). This fi-
nal clause does not appear in the current survival statute, and modern practice virtually
always includes the decedent's pain and suffering as the principal component of damages
in survival claims. See id. § 8.01-25 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
9. Id. § 8.01-25 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
10. Id. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
11. Id. § 8.01-56 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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II. THE CENTRA HEALTH CASE
So what does a plaintiff do if the cause of death is in dispute in
the case? The Supreme Court of Virginia confronted that issue in
Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins." There, an eighty-four-year-old
patient was admitted to a Lynchburg hospital and received negli-
gent care during and after surgery to repair a broken hip.13 The
patient stayed in the hospital for nine days before being released
to a nursing home to continue his recovery.' 4 But he was brought
back to the hospital the next day, eventually slipped into a coma,
and died eighteen days after the operation. 15 His personal repre-
sentatives sued for medical malpractice, asserting wrongful death
and survival claims in the same complaint. 16
The hospital denied negligence, and it also denied that the pa-
tient's death was proximately caused by its care for the elderly,
infirm man.17 It contended that his broken hip, in combination
with his "very debilitated, chronically ill" condition, was the ulti-
mate cause of death.!8 Citing Hendrix v. Daugherty, the hospital
called for the administrators to elect which action to pursue at
trial, since they could not recover for both survival claims and
wrongful death. 9
A. Hendrix v. Daugherty
Hendrix was a legal malpractice suit brought against attorneys
who missed a statute of limitations in similar circumstances."
The attorneys had asserted wrongful death and survival claims,
both alleging medical negligence by a hospital and a products lia-
bility claim against a manufacturer, arising out of the death of a
12. 277 Va. 59, 63, 670 S.E.2d 708, 709 (2009).
13. Id. at 64, 670 S.E.2d at 709.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 64, 81, 670 S.E.2d at 709-10, 719.
16. Id. at 64, 670 S.E.2d at 710.
17. Id.
18. Trial Transcript at 79, 81, Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d
708 (2009) (No. 080008).
19. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 64-65, 670 S.E.2d at 710 (citing Hendrix v. Daugherty,
249 Va. 540, 547, 457 S.E.2d 71, 75 (1995)).
20. Hendrix, 249 Va. at 542-43, 457 S.E.2d at 72-73.
2009]
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child.21 The parents later sued the attorneys, claiming that but for
his missing the statute of limitations, they would have recovered
for the injuries to, or the death of, their son.22
One major issue in the appeal was whether the parents would
have to elect between presenting a legal malpractice claim based
on the wrongful death claim or one based on the survival claim.23
The supreme court resolved the issue in this manner:
The plain language contained in Code §§ 8.01-25 and -56 unequi-
vocally mandates that a person may not recover for the same injury
under the survival statute and the wrongful death statute. There can
be but one recovery. Hence, the plaintiffs in this action, as a matter
of law, could not have recovered in the underlying tort action against
defendants on both theories of wrongful death and survival. There-
fore, it necessarily follows that in the present action, at an appropri-
ate time after discovery has been completed, the plaintiffs must be
required to elect whether they will proceed against the defendant at-
torneys on the theory that the attorneys breached a duty owed to the
plaintiffs in the prosecution of the wrongful death action or breached
a duty owed to the plaintiffs in the prosecution of the survival ac-
tion.24
B. Centra Health Trial Proceedings
Ever since Hendrix, tort lawyers have abided by the premise
that an election had to be made in a medical malpractice case at
some point after the completion of discovery. But the administra-
tors of Mullins's estate refused to agree that they could not
present both claims at trial; they wanted to ask the jury to re-
solve the factual dispute over cause of death.25 After all, they rea-
soned, if the jury is to decide whether the hospital's negligence
caused the death, why should we have to run the risk of guessing
incorrectly?26
The administrators found a sympathetic ear in the trial court.
The judge, buoyed by a number of circuit court decisions that had
permitted claimants to proceed to trial on both theories in this
21. Id. at 542, 457 S.E.2d at 73.
22. Id. at 543, 457 S.E.2d at 73.
23. Id. at 546, 457 S.E.2d at 75.
24. Id. at 547, 457 S.E.2d at 75-76.
25. Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 Va. 59, 64-65, 670 S.E.2d 708, 710 (2009).
26. Id. at 65, 670 S.E.2d at 710.
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situation,27 refused to require a pretrial election because "the jury
can determine causation."28 Instead, the trial court permitted both
sides to adduce expert testimony at trial on the question of
whether the hospital's acts caused the patient's death.29
At first glance, this ruling seemed to indicate a departure from
the Hendrix doctrine. Here, the court evidently was not requiring
a post-discovery election at all, and was permitting the adminis-
trators to present both claims to the jury. This, the hospital
pointed out, would lead to the introduction of otherwise inadmiss-
ible evidence20 For example, in a survival claim, evidence of the
survivors' mental anguish is immaterial and therefore inadmissi-
ble; in a wrongful death claim, evidence of the decedent's suffer-
ing is similarly inadmissible.2' In addition to their expert testi-
mony on causation, the administrators presented both types of
damage evidence in their case-in-chief.32
The trial judge addressed this problem by carefully instructing
the jury on the difference between the two causes of action, and
then telling it how to evaluate the two claims:
I will go over it again, but instruction sixteen we call the wrong-
ful death damages. Instruction seventeen is the survival damage in-
struction. They are effectively going to be mutually exclusive. If you
decide to award damages, you can do it under one.
If you find negligence caused the death, you can do it under that.
If you find it just caused the injury, you can do it under seventeen,
but you can't do both. You've got to choose. That's a jury issue for
y'all to resolve, and you have to determine one or the other.
23
27. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 710; see, e.g., Williams v. Med. Facilities of Am., 75 Va. Cir. 416,
417 (Cir. Ct. 2005) (Virginia Beach City) ("Whether the defendants' negligence caused in-
juries or death is a fact for the jury to determine. It would be unjust to force a plaintiff to
choose one theory of recovery only to discover that the jury reached the opposite conclu-
sion. Plaintiff would be left without a remedy even though the defendant was found to be
at fault. While Plaintiff is permitted to proceed both on a survivorship and wrongful death
claim, Plaintiff will recover on only one theory."). Circuit court cases on both sides of this
issue are collected in a footnote to the Centra Health opinion. See 277 Va. at 77 n.6, 670
S.E.2d at 717 n.6.
28. Transcript of Motions Hearing at 14-15, Centra Health, 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d
708 (No. 080008).
29. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 65, 68, 670 S.E.2d at 710, 712.
30. Transcript of Pretrial Hearing at 3-6, Centra Health, 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d 708
(No. 080008).
31. See, e.g., Breeding v. Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 659-60, 159 S.E.2d 836, 842 (1968).
32. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 68, 670 S.E.2d at 712.
33. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 111.
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Having considered conflicting testimony from the parties' medical
expert witnesses on the cause of death, the jury found that the
hospital was negligent, and that its negligence caused injuries to
the patient, but not his death.3 4 The jury returned a verdict in fa-
vor of the administrators, on the survival claim only, for
$325,000. 35 The trial court denied the hospital's post-verdict mo-
tions and entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.36
On appeal, the question of when, exactly, an election would be
required was squarely before the supreme court:
Since deciding Hendrix, we have not been afforded the opportu-
nity to address further the circumstances that would constitute the
"appropriate time after discovery has been completed" at which a cir-
cuit court must require an election between a survival personal in-
jury claim and a wrongful death claim. Nor have we specifically ad-
dressed whether there can be circumstances in which that
"appropriate time" might be after the trier of fact has resolved dis-
puted issues of liability. However, as the parties noted in the circuit
court and on brief in this appeal, a number of circuit court cases
tried since Lucas have dealt with these and related issues, but with-
out any consistent agreement as to when and under what circum-
stances an election of remedy would be required. The facts and the
procedural posture of the present case, therefore, provide this Court
with the opportunity to address directly the issues left unresolved by
Lucas,37 Bulala,3" and Hendrix.
39
C. Centra Health in the Supreme Court of Virginia
On brief and in oral argument, the hospital contended that a
plain reading of Hendrix mandated an election at some point af-
ter discovery." It noted that if a plaintiff could indeed present
both claims to the jury, then the result in Hendrix would have
been different, since the legal malpractice plaintiffs in that case
simply could have presented both theories at trial, and invited
34. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 71, 670 S.E.2d at 713.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 71-72, 670 S.E.2d at 713-14.
37. Lucas v. HCMF Corp., 238 Va. 446, 384 S.E.2d 92 (1989).
38. Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990).
39. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 76-77, 670 S.E.2d at 717.
40. Id. at 76-78, 670 S.E.2d at 717-18.
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the jury to select the better one.41 It argued that an election after
verdict was in effect no election at all. 42
The administrators responded by noting that, in Hendrix, when
the defense had moved for an election in the medical malpractice
action, the plaintiffs attorneys had agreed to do so without dis-
puting whether a pretrial election was required. 43 That meant
that any objection to the election would be regarded as invited er-
ror, 4 4 and the supreme court was not free to revisit the need for
such an election when the legal malpractice claim came up for
consideration. 4.
The administrators also argued that the hospital had, in this
instance, created the dispute by denying that its actions led to the
death.46 Hospitals, they reasoned, should not be empowered to
"require a plaintiff to jettison one potentially meritorious theory
of recovery in order to get to trial."47 They contended that the
Constitution of Virginia consigns factual determinations to ju-
ries,48 so the jury should be permitted to resolve the ultimate is-
sue in this dispute.49
In deciding the issue, the court noted that its directive in Hen-
drix-that an election should take place "at an appropriate time
after discovery has been completed"-does not require that that
"appropriate time" must be before the jury resolves the facts:
Contrary to Centra Health's contention, we did not hold in Hendrix
that a plaintiff would always be required to elect between remedies
prior to trial. Rather, the election is required only at a time when the
record sufficiently establishes that the personal injuries and the
death arose from the same cause. In this particular case, the circuit
court correctly determined that compelling an election would put the
administrators in the untenable, and manifestly unjust, position of
41. Brief of Appellant at 18-19, Centra Health, 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d 708 (No.
080008).
42. Id.
43. Brief of Appellees at 8, Centra Health, 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d 708 (No. 080008).
44. Wright v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 245 Va. 160, 170, 427 S.E.2d 724, 729 (1993) ("[A]
litigant will not be permitted to invite a trial court to commit error, either through agree-
ing or failing to object, and then be permitted to successfully complain of such error on ap-
peal.").
45. Brief of Appellees, supra note 43, at 8.
46. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 65, 670 S.E.2d at 710.
47. Brief of Appellees, supra note 43, at 9.
48. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
49. Brief of Appellees, supra note 43, at 9.
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having to elect between two potentially viable claims, which Centra
Health was contesting on separate and independent grounds. Under
those circumstances, there was no "appropriate time" prior to trial at
which compelling an election would not have prejudiced the adminis-
trators and, consequently, unfairly benefited Centra Health."°
D. The "Centra Health Doctrine"
To the extent there will be a lasting "Centra Health doctrine,"
this is it. This calculus was precisely what the administrators had
sought, and it is the heart of the court's holding in the case; from
here, the remainder of the court's rulings flow inevitably. This
ruling sweeps aside the previous notions of most tort lawyers,
who had come to regard Hendrix's mandate of an election "after
discovery" as meaning "before trial." Legal literature before Cen-
tra Health had presumed that the two claims could not be tried
together. 51
This does not mean, however, that plaintiffs will always be
permitted to intermingle their survival and wrongful death
claims before juries. First and foremost, if there is no dispute as
to the cause of death, this situation will not arise. If the parties
agree that the decedent died from the condition asserted in the
complaint, then only a wrongful death claim will be viable.-5 The
reverse is also true-if the parties agree that death ensued from
extrinsic conditions, then only a survival action can be pre-
sented.,3
50. 277 Va. at 79, 670 S.E.2d at 718.
51. See, e.g., K. Sinclair & L. B. Middleditch, Virginia Civil Procedure § 4.9 (4th ed.
2003) ("[I]t is doubtful that a wrongful death action and an action pursuant to § 8.01-25
may be joined.") (cited in Brief of Appellant, supra note 41, at 16).
52. This issue was addressed in an amicus curiae brief filed in the case by the Virginia
Trial Lawyers Association:
In many cases the 'appropriate time' will be the completion of discovery. For
example, responses to Requests for Admission, expert designations, and sti-
pulations may show that the nature of the injury, whether it be wrongful
death or personal injury, is not in dispute. In those cases it may be proper for
the trial court to order the plaintiff to elect a remedy.
Brief for Virginia Trial Lawyers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 7, Centra
Health, 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d 708 (No. 080008). The administrators also conceded before
trial that if the cause of death were uncontroverted, they would be required to elect. Tran-
script of Motions Hearing, supra note 28, at 8 ("The cause of death is contested. If they
stipulated to the cause of death, it would be uncontested and then there would be a wrong-
ful death action for those injuries that caused death.").
53. See Centra Health, 277 Va. at 79, 670 S.E.2d at 718.
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Second, the supreme court suggests bifurcation as an appropri-
ate vehicle to deal with situations where the cause of death is
contested.5 Bifurcation removes the possibility of any danger
from the introduction of improper damage evidence. 55 This sug-
gestion is likely to be more happily received by the defense bar
than by plaintiffs lawyers, as both groups know that, regardless
of cautionary instructions, it is virtually impossible for jurors to
completely divorce their evaluation of liability from their view of
the plaintiffs injuries.56 Bifurcation was not an issue in the Cen-
tra Health case because the hospital did not request it at trial,
but this opinion puts every defense attorney on notice.
Not all judges will be eager to bifurcate trials, as they may
perceive that bifurcation lengthens the trial process. In circum-
stances where the judge does not bifurcate, careful instruction to
the jury may suffice to eliminate the possible influence of evi-
dence of the "other" type of claim.57 Defense attorneys would
probably be well-advised to object to simple jury instruction since
bifurcation will work better in almost all instances from the de-
fense perspective. But the argument in favor of relying on de-
tailed instructions is persuasive; trial courts commonly instruct
juries to disregard certain elements of testimony, or even classes
of evidence-such as when one claim in a civil suit, or one count
in a criminal indictment, has been dismissed on a motion to
strike.58
Third, some defendants may be able to persuade the trial judge
that the admission of both kinds of evidence in a particular case
would be so prejudicial as to justify an election. In that event, the
argument would be based on an underlying evidentiary ruling
54. Id. at 78, 670 S.E.2d at 718 ("Indeed, in a case where there is any doubt as to
when compelling an election would be proper, bifurcation is the most practical means to
assure that each party receives a fair opportunity to present their case to the jury without
prejudice to the other.").
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford, Thinking About Elephants: Admonitions, Empiri-
cal Research and Legal Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645, 645-46 (1992).
57. The jury is presumed to heed admonitions to disregard stricken evidence. Stump
v. Doe, 250 Va. 57, 62, 458 S.E.2d 279, 282 (1995).
58. See, e.g., Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Dunn, 181 Va. 390, 392-93, 25 S.E.2d
254, 255-56 (1943) (citing Bourne v. Richardson, 133 Va. 441, 455, 113 S.E. 893, 898
(1922)) ("'A judgment ought not to be reversed for the admission of evidence or for a
statement of counsel which the court afterwards directs the jury to disregard unless there
is a manifest probability that the evidence or statement has been prejudicial to the ad-
verse party.").
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that the evidence is more prejudicial than probative,59 thus plac-
ing the onus on the plaintiff to decide which claim to present to
the jury. But it would require truly remarkable circumstances to
convince a trial judge to bypass the option of bifurcation-which
the supreme court has specifically recommended-and order an
election in the wake of Centra Health. °
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
Most lawyers reading Hendrix would have assumed that re-
quiring an election "at an appropriate time after discovery has
been completed" means requiring an election before the case is
tendered to the jury for decision.6 1 Otherwise, it is not much of an
election; it is more like a horse race in which you get to place your
bets after all the riders cross the finish line. At that point, a de-
fendant might grumble, and the whole concept of an "election"
has been gutted. So what changed?
A. First Thoughts
First, and most obviously, the court changed. Of the seven jus-
tices who decided Hendrix, only two were still on the court four-
teen years later when Centra Health arrived on the argument
docket. 62 There is a very real possibility that the current makeup
of the court is more equitable than were the current justices' rela-
tively recent forebears, but broad philosophical speculation like
that is beyond the scope of this essay.
This explanation is probably too simplistic; two members of the
Hendrix court stuck around long enough to decide Centra Health,
and both decisions were unanimous. 63 Indeed, the Hendrix opi-
nion was written by then-Justice, now-Chief Justice, Leroy Has-
sell. 4 Chief Justice Hassell is by no means a butterfly in terms of
59. Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).
60. See Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 Va. 59, 78, 670 S.E.2d 708, 718 (2009).
61. Hendrix v. Daugherty, 249 Va. 540, 547, 457 S.E.2d 71, 76 (1995).
62. Chief Justice Leroy R. Hassell and Justice Barbara M. Keenan were the two jus-
tices deciding both Hendrix and Centra Health. Compare Justices of the Supreme Court
During the Time of These Reports, 249 Va. (1995), with Justices of the Supreme Court
During the Time of These Reports, 277 Va. (2009).
63. See generally Centra Health, 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d 708; Hendrix, 249 Va. 540,
457 S.E.2d 71.
64. See Hendrix, 249 Va. at 542, 457 S.E.2d at 72.
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legal scholarship; changing his mind from a firmly expressed view
like that in Hendrix is a significant undertaking. That leads to
the conclusion that there is a qualitative difference between the
two cases to distinguish the holdings.
In all likelihood, that difference does not arise from the differ-
ent procedural postures (one appeal directly implicated medical
malpractice, while the other did so only indirectly).65 In a legal
malpractice case such as Hendrix, a plaintiff must prove two ele-
ments-negligence and causation.6 Often, as in Hendrix, proving
negligence is child's play; the defendant's attorneys missed the
statute of limitations, patently violating the standard of care.6 7
Proof of causation (sometimes called the "case within the case"68)
is more complex; the plaintiff must show that but for the lawyer's
error, the plaintiff would have obtained a recovery. 69 This requires
an examination of the merits of the underlying case in which the
lawyer's alleged negligence occurred.70 If the suit was a dead loser
to begin with, then the lawyer's error did not cause the plaintiff
any damages.71
In this context, the point at which election is ultimately re-
quired will probably be the same, or at least parallel, in both
types of cases. That is, legal malpractice plaintiffs will be re-
quired to elect at the same point of the case in which a tort plain-
tiff would have been required to do so. In this respect, Centra
Health probably gives legal malpractice plaintiffs a bit of serendi-
pitous breathing space, at least in cases like this one where a key
element of causation is disputed. The ruling unquestionably libe-
65. Compare Centra Health, 277 Va. at 63, 670 S.E.2d at 709 (involving an appeal
from a decision in a medical malpractice action), with Hendrix, 249 Va. at 542, 457 S.E.2d
at 72-73 (involving an appeal from a judgment in a legal malpractice action based on an
underlying medical malpractice action).
66. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Kaestner, 243 Va. 169, 172, 413 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1992).
67. See id. at 170-72, 413 S.E.2d at 348-49.
68. Whitley v. Chamouris, 265 Va. 9, 11, 574 S.E.2d 251, 252-53 (2003) ("The plaintiff
must present virtually the same evidence that would have been presented in the underly-
ing action. Similarly, the defendant is entitled to present evidence and assert defenses
that would have been presented in the underlying action.").
69. Duvall, Blackburn, Hale & Downey v. Siddiqui, 243 Va. 494, 497, 416 S.E.2d 448,
450 (1992) ("An attorney is liable only for actual injury to his client and damages will be
calculated on the basis of the value of what is lost by the client.").
70. See Whitley, 265 Va. at 11, 574 S.E.2d at 252-53.
71. Id., 574 S.E.2d at 253 ("In order to show proximate cause and resulting damages,
a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to convince the fact finder in the malpractice
case that he would have prevailed in the underlying case absent the attorney's alleged
negligence.").
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ralizes the strict demands of the Hendrix opinion in legal mal-
practice cases.
B. Alternative Pleading
In the supreme court, the parties addressed the question of
whether the plaintiff should be required to risk a wrong guess on
how the jury will view the evidence.12 The administrators asserted
that if an early election were required, a defendant could force a
plaintiff to gamble. 73 Since, in this case, the need for an election
was produced by the hospital's decision to contest the cause of
death, the administrators argued that it was unfair to force that
risk on them.74 The hospital responded that the only way it could
eliminate this risk was to assume risk of its own-for example, by
admitting causation of death.15 That would eliminate one primary
problem from the defendant's perspective-the admissibility of
damage evidence from the "other" type of claim-but it would
make the defendant forgo its opportunity to win the case on the
causation question.
The supreme court's opinion did not squarely address this
question of economic theory, but its resolution of the case leaves
no doubt of the court's sentiment on the matter. Explaining the
earlier Lucas decision, it held that a plaintiff cannot be deprived
of the opportunity to present and prove the claims she wishes to
present.76 In Lucas, the plaintiff brought a survival claim, but on
cross-examination, the plaintiffs expert testified that the defen-
dant's negligence "hastened" the death.77 Technically, that made
it a wrongful death claim, and the defendant accordingly moved
immediately to dismiss .7 The trial court granted that motion, but
the supreme court reversed, holding that "[d]ismissal of the ac-
tion prior to completion of her evidence deprived Lucas of [the op-
72. Brief of Appellees, supra note 43, at 3, 9.
73. Id. at 9-10.
74. Id. at 9.
75. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 41, at 21.
76. Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 Va. 59, 78, 79, 670 S.E.2d 708, 717, 718 (2009)
("[Tihe plaintiff ought not be compelled to make the election without a full opportunity to
develop its case .... [The early election requirement places the plaintiff in the] untenable,
and manifestly unjust, position of having to elect between two potentially viable claims
77. Lucas v. HCMF Corp., 238 Va. 446, 449, 384 S.E.2d 92, 93 (1989).
78. Id.
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portunity to prove her survival claim] and, therefore, constituted
error. 
79
Interestingly, the issue of alternative pleading may have arisen
in the Lucas trial court. But the matter was determined to have
been procedurally defaulted, as it was not properly preserved for
appeal;80 it thus fell victim to the supreme court's contemporane-
ous objection rule,8' leaving the question of alternative claims for
the Centra Health court.
C. Judicial Estoppel and Supreme Court Rule 1:6
In the Centra Health briefs, both parties assumed that the re-
quirement of an election would foreclose the possibility that the
plaintiff could later pursue the "other" claim, perhaps in subse-
quent litigation, by nonsuiting the claim not chosen.82 The hospit-
al described wrongful death and survival claims as "mutually ex-
clusive," implying that a choice to proceed on one claim would
work a judicial estoppel to present the other separately. 3 The
administrators described the effect of a required election in even
starker terms: "As the trial court recognized, where the defendant
contests the cause of death, it is fundamentally unfair to require
a plaintiff to jettison one potentially meritorious theory of recov-
ery in order to get to trial."84
Judicial estoppel is unlikely to bar subsequent litigation of the
alternate claim after an election. That doctrine prohibits a party
from assuming contradictory positions in litigation (even succes-
sive litigation) between the same parties.85 But in order to act as a
bar, the party must have prevailed on that issue in the first liti-
gation.8 6 Thus, if a plaintiff unsuccessfully asks a jury to find that
a defendant's negligence caused a wrongful death, he would not
be barred from trying again, with another jury, to prove a surviv-
79. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 93-94.
80. Id. at 449 n.*, 384 S.E.2d at 94 n.*.
81. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
83. Brief of Appellant, supra note 41, at 16.
84. Brief of Appellees, supra note 43, at 9.
85. Lofton Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 268 Va. 377, 380-81, 601 S.E.2d 648, 650
(2004).
86. Bentley Funding Group v. SK&R Group, 269 Va. 315, 327, 609 S.E.2d 49, 54-55
(2005).
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al claim. Nevertheless, this approach is fraught with expense,
practical difficulties, and the specter of inconsistent verdicts.
For example, assume that in a first trial the plaintiff, required
to elect, chooses to present a wrongful death claim. The jury de-
termines that the defendant is negligent, and also finds that the
negligence caused injuries, but not death. It accordingly returns a
verdict in favor of the defendant, since the plaintiff did not prove
that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
death. The plaintiff then presents a survival claim to a separate
jury in subsequent litigation. This jury also finds the defendant to
be negligent, but determines that the negligence did cause the
death. Judgment in this case is quite properly for the defendant,
since such a claim is necessarily brought under the wrongful
death statutes.
In this instance, both juries have found the defendant negli-
gent, but the plaintiff is left wholly without a remedy, solely as a
result of the obligation to elect. This unpalatable scenario may
have been the foundation for the court's refusal to order an elec-
tion.
A separate doctrine could, however, pose a great danger to liti-
gants. During oral argument, Justice Cynthia Kinser posed to
counsel the question of whether a judgment on one claim would
bar later litigation of the other claim.87 The doctrine of res judica-
ta claim preclusion, as now reflected in Rule 1:6, may well bar
such re-litigation.88 The rule bars
any second or subsequent civil action against the same opposing par-
ty or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from that
same conduct, transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal
theory or rights asserted in the second or subsequent action were
raised in the prior lawsuit .... 89
Thus, while the rule did not govern this case, 90 the court likely
considered that its application would render any election conclu-
sive in future litigation. While the opinion does not mention the
87. While there are no publicly available transcripts of supreme court oral arguments,
suffice it to say that the author has direct personal knowledge of Justice Kinser's query.
88. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:16 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
89. Id.
90. Rule 1:6 was promulgated in 2006, and applies to all suits filed on or after July 1
of that year. Id. The administrators filed suit against Centra Health on December 1, 2005,
so the new rule did not apply to this action. Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 Va. 59, 64,
670 S.E.2d 708, 710 (2009).
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new rule,91 this, too, may have played a key role in the justices'
shift of views between Hendrix and Centra Health.
D. Other Significant Holdings
While the election of remedies ruling is the most visible one in
Centra Health, the supreme court also addressed two additional
assignments of error presented by the hospital. First, it turned
aside a challenge to the administrators' evidence on the survival
claim, because the plaintiffs expert physician had opined that the
hospital's negligence had caused the patient's death.92 The hospit-
al argued that since no plaintiffs witness testified that the inju-
ries did not cause the death, there was no support in the plain-
tiffs case for the survival claim.93
The administrators argued in response that the hospital had
supplied exactly such testimony in its own case-in-chief, and since
the sufficiency of the evidence must be evaluated with regard to
the evidence adduced by both parties, the result was supported by
the overall trial record. 94 They reasoned that juries "can and often
do determine that the truth is a synthesis of the plaintiffs and
defendant's theories and evidence."9'
The supreme court adopted a simpler view, holding that juries
are entitled not only to select which witness is more credible, but
also which portions of a single party's evidence are worthy of ac-
ceptance.9 6 Here, the court noted that the administrators' expert
opined that the hospital injured the patient, and he also opined
91. As of the date of publication of this note in late 2009, the supreme court has not
addressed Rule 1:6 in any of its decisions.
92. See Centra Health, 277 Va. at 79, 670 S.E.2d at 718-19.
93. Brief of Appellant, supra note 41, at 33 ("[The administrators] failed to present
expert testimony on causation in support of [the survival] claim; there was no evidence [in
the administrators' case-in-chiefl that the negligence caused injury but not death.").
94. Brief of Appellees, supra note 43, at 10-13. Under Virginia practice, if a defendant
unsuccessfully moves to strike the plaintiffs evidence, and then elects to present evidence
of its own, an appellate court reviewing the evidence will consider the entire record, not
merely that part of it that was adduced in the plaintiffs case-in-chief. Norfolk S. Ry. v.
Rogers, 270 Va. 468, 481, 621 S.E.2d 59, 66-67 (2005). If a defendant wishes to preserve
its original motion to strike for appellate review, so that the appellate court considers only
the plaintiffs evidence, it faces the unpalatable prospect of resting without presenting any
evidence at all.
95. Brief of Appellees, supra note 43, at 12.
96. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 80, 670 S.E.2d at 719.
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that those injuries led to death.97 The court concluded that the
jury was at liberty to accept the former evidence but not the lat-
ter:
In light of the fact that Centra Health continued to dispute the issue
of causation with respect to the wrongful death claim, the jury would
have been free to discount Dr. Pambianco's conclusion that the hos-
pital staffs negligence. .. contributed to Mullins' death, while still
accepting that portion of the testimony establishing that the negli-
gence... caused Mullins' personal injuries.9"
Accordingly, even viewed in isolation, the administrators' evi-
dence supported the survival claim.
The other ancillary issue in this opinion relates to the hospit-
al's contention that the $325,000 verdict was excessive.9 9 The hos-
pital pointed out that the survival claim wholly arose during the
last eighteen days of the patients' life, "most of which he spent in
a comatose state."100 It contended that the blended evidence re-
ceived by the jury, including testimony by the survivors about
their own emotional distress at the patient's death, must have in-
fluenced the jury to award an amount that was much higher than
the evidence had justified for the survival claim alone.1 1
The supreme court rejected this assignment of error as well. 10 2
It concluded that the jury had been carefully instructed on how to
evaluate the separate claims and noted that the hospital had not
requested a cautionary instruction (to disregard damage evidence
relating to the "other" claim when fixing damages) at trial.10 3 The
opinion concludes with the court's ruling that the amount of the
verdict was supported by the evidence.104
The standard of review of damage awards almost compels such
a result. Appellate courts reviewing jury verdicts are not free to
substitute their own views as to what amount of damages would
be appropriate; such a determination is left to the jury, which has
the opportunity to see the witnesses firsthand and evaluate what
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 80-81, 670 S.E.2d at 719.
100. Brief of Appellant, supra note 41, at 35.
101. Id. at 34-36.
102. Centra Health, 277 Va. at 82, 670 S.E.2d at 720.
103. Id. at 81, 670 S.E.2d at 719-20.
104. Id. at 82, 670 S.E.2d at 720.
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damages would be appropriate."5 Even a trial judge who has simi-
larly seen the evidence is not free to become an "additional juror"
and substitute his view of damages for that of the jury's; he can
only set aside or reduce such an award if the amount of the award
is so large as to shock his conscience.0 6
IV. CONCLUSION
As observed in the beginning of this essay, other areas of law
also require elections. 10 7 The Centra Health doctrine may affect
some of those cases, depending on whether the election turns on a
disputed fact, as here. Some elections emphatically will not be af-
fected; for example, a plaintiff seeking both rescission and specific
performance of the same contract in the same pleading has an
election problem that is entirely divorced from the Centra Health
holding. 08 He has to decide what to ask the court for, not simply
what his theory of the case will be. But where a factual issue
arises-especially where it is created by the defendant's plead-
ing-litigants can expect the supreme court to side with a plain-
tiff who wants that issue decided before he elects.
105. Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 248 Va. 40, 45, 445 S.E.2d 140, 144
(1994) ("Ordinarily, a damage award fixed by a jury after a properly conducted trial and
approved by the trial judge is held to be inviolate against disturbance by the appellate
court.").
106. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 265 Va. 383, 394-95, 579 S.E.2d 180, 186 (2003).
107. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
108. The supreme court's none-too-subtle aside in Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, 266
Va. 558, 560-61, 587 S.E.2d 581, 583 (2004) ("This case is not about claims that are irre-
concilable, such as a claim for rescission of the contract accompanied by a claim for specific
performance.") and its even stronger language in McLeskey v. Ocean Park Investors, Ltd.,
242 Va. 51, 52, 405 S.E.2d 846, 846 (1991) (holding that a party is barred from seeking
rescission after a long course of insisting on specific performance) should dissuade any
such hybrid pleadings for the foreseeable future.
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